Doing so might create an Iraq-like moment where feared capabilities catalyze preemptive military action that turns out to be mistaken. While it is important not to let attention to North Korea’s nuclear weapons obscure the potential dangers CBW capabilities may pose, it is equally important not to overstate those dangers. Conversely, hasty action can lead to a different form of disaster. policymakers and military leaders is that they cannot wait until the “enemy is at the gate,” the evidence is incontrovertible, and they are facing disaster before taking action. Chemical and biological weapons do not require as much industrial infrastructure or unique materials as nuclear weapons programs. It is certainly possible, however, that the technical sophistication necessary to develop a nuclear capability, has been applied to CBW for the contingency of a non-nuclear fight. The regime’s nuclear and missile programs would appear to provide a credible deterrent against an external military threat.
In the case of North Korea, we know very little about either past or present CBW programs, plans, or intentions. Pretending to have capabilities he did not was hard to imagine. Former Iraq President Saddam Hussein’s reluctance to openly disclose the abandonment of his WMD programs for fear of appearing weak to his own people, or historical enemies such as Iran or the United States, confused assessments of Iraq’s capabilities.
In the Iraq case, the United States knew a good deal about past efforts, but not much about the status of the program at the start of the 2003 military operation. There are some parallels with what we knew about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program before 2003. Avoiding the “Iraq Moment” in North Korea This article attempts to put in context what little is known about North Korea’s capabilities and offer some measures that might be taken to help curtail those capabilities. civilian and military leaders must consider.
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As the international community grapples with how to reduce tension on the Peninsula, re-assessing what is known about North Korea’s CBW program and considering options to minimize their role in the regime’s security calculous is an important addition to the complex set of issues that U.S. In recent years, while North Korea (formally the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has gone to great lengths to demonstrate to the world its nuclear and missile programs, the country has hidden whatever CBW it may possess.
By contrast, extensive documentation and histories of nuclear weapons programs exist for virtually all the known weapons states as well as those that abandoned such programs. Aside from the United States, the former Soviet Union, South Africa, and Iraq-countries that have disclosed the nature of their past biological weapons programs-comparatively little is known about other state biological weapons programs.īiological weapons programs tend to be among the most closely guarded weapons programs in a country’s arsenal. Lack of knowledge about North Korea’s biological weapons capabilities is not unique. While there is some confidence in the assessments of North Korea’s chemical weapons capabilities, comparatively little is known about its biological weapons capabilities. If a conflict were to erupt short of a nuclear exchange, many fear North Korea might use chemical or biological weapons (CBW). The conventional forces aligned along the 38 th parallel, the border between North and South Korea, are formidable. Any major conflict on the Korean Peninsula would put thousands of lives at risk even if it were well short of a nuclear exchange.
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